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ABSTRACT 
Both Venezuela and Chile have increased their defense spending since 2003. This 
thesis seeks to answer the following question: Is the commodities boom in South 
America responsible for the region’s increased defense spending? First, it must be 
determined whether the increase in defense spending is due to an existing arms race, the 
historically high revenues of a commodity boom, or if it is simply a military 
modernization effort. What are the possible reactions of neighboring countries? Further, 
can game theory be used to provide predictions for regional conflict in South America?  
Despite the specter of an arms race in the region, this thesis explains that the 
increased defense spending in both Chile and Venezuela relates more to the 2003–2008 
commodity boom than a competitive arms build-up in the region. The 2003–2008 
commodity boom and resulting availability of resources, combined with the need to 
upgrade decades-old, dilapidated military hardware have resulted in a fury of military 
hardware purchases throughout the region. Additionally, this thesis will provide 
predictions from game theory literature for regional conflict in South America as other 
countries in the region have experienced the same benefits of the 2003–2008 commodity 
boom, and thus have increased defense spending. Using a reciprocating strategy from 
Robert Axelrod’s groundbreaking work, Theory of Evolution. An analysis of the strategy 
called TIT for TAT shows that cooperation between South American countries is more 
likely when used assuming indefinite future relations.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Defense spending around the world has increased since 2003 and the situation in 
South America is no different.1 Many South American countries have increased their 
defense budgets in recent years, but two countries, in particular, standout. Chile and 
Venezuela are rapidly expanding their military capabilities.  Chile recently purchased ten 
F-16 fighter planes, eight frigate war ships, two submarines and 118 Leopard IIA tanks.2 
Venezuela recently purchased dozens of Russian fighter jets and attack helicopters, as 
well as 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles.3 Due to historically high copper and oil prices, their 
budgets are flush with additional pesos and bolivars to finance the increased defense 
spending. Although neither country has been involved in a major military conflict in 
decades, both Chile and Venezuela continue to buy advanced, highly capable military 
hardware. “Latin Americans for the most part do not fear aggression from their 
neighbors… they do not expect to go to war with one another.”4  With few internal and 
external threats, experts question the reasoning behind the buildup.5 
Three possible theories can explain Chile and Venezuela’s military expansion. 
The first emphasizes the existing arms race in Latin America and argues that Chile and 
Venezuela are just keeping pace with other military powers in the region such as Brazil 
and Colombia. A second theory links the additional spending to the explosive increase in 
copper and oil prices due to the 2003–2008 commodities boom. The Chilean military gets 
a guaranteed percentage of the profits from copper exports. The Venezuelan military does 
not have direct access to oil revenues for equipment purchases. However, with oil prices 
at all-time highs from 2003 to 2008, they do benefit from increased budgets. In addition, 
                                                 
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 2008. 
2 Alex Sanchez, "Chile's Aggressive Military Arms Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in 
Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina." COHA.org. Aug 7, 2007. www.coha.org (accessed May 15, 2008).  
3 Simon Romero, "Venezuela Spending on Arms Soars to World's Top Ranks." New York Times, Feb 
25, 2007: 1-3. 
4 Jorge I. Dominguez, Boundary Disputes in Latin America. Institutional Report, Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2003.  
5 Wendy Hunter’s State and Soldier in Latin America, examines efforts to identify and assign missions 
to the armed forces in Latin America in the Post Cold War era. 
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Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s anti-United States rhetoric justifies additional 
spending, with Chávez claiming that the United States is planning an attack. In doing so, 
he is making the connection between threat levels and defense spending, and using high 
oil prices to fund the buildup.  A third theory points to the need for military 
modernization after years of being denied access to high-tech equipment; this 
modernization is said to be necessary for the militaries to provide the basic protections 
for each country.  
Whatever the reasons behind the military buildup, the fear among U.S. policy 
makers, and the international community generally, is how other countries in the region 
perceive and react to the buildup. Some fear that, with Chile and Venezuela’s increased 
military power, its neighbors will be pressured into keeping pace. Exploring the 
consequences of their increased defense spending is as important as understanding the 
causes. Other countries in South America have benefited from the commodities boom as 
well and have made additional military expenditures.  Considered one of the most 
peaceful regions in the world in terms of conventional inter-state warfare, it begs the 
question: Why, in South America, would countries without a viable external threat make 
the decision to spend money on the military, especially when it could be spent on social 
and economic programs? Are South American countries reacting to the military 
capabilities buildup in Chile and Venezuela, effectively entering an arms race? This 
thesis intends to answer the question of why both Chile and Venezuela have increased 
their defense spending since 2003. Is the commodity boom in South America responsible 
for the region’s increased defense spending and what are the possible reactions of 
neighboring countries? Using predictions from game theory literature, policy 
recommendations will be provided for avoiding regional conflict in South America. 
A. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHILE AND VENEZUELA’S 
DEFENSE SPENDING 
The literature related to defense spending in Latin America analyzes various 
periods from the 1970s through the 1990s, but few studies focus on the latest 
commodities boom, which began in 2003 and has continued to 2008. Chile and 
Venezuela, along with several other South American countries, benefit from the high 
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prices of commodities such as copper, oil, gold, natural gas, and agricultural products.  
Three different theories are used here to explain the recent increase in defense spending 
in Latin America. The first explains that Chile and Venezuela are already competing in a 
regional arms race. The second argues that, due to the increase in copper and oil 
revenues, both countries simply have more money to dedicate to defense spending. The 
third states that both Chile and Venezuela have old, outdated military equipment that is in 
desperate need of upgrading. 
An arms race can be complex and difficult to define, especially during the post-
cold war era in South America. An arms race is not simply a competitive buildup of 
militaries between countries, but is based on several underlying factors that are key to a 
regional arms race. While several countries continue to expand their military capabilities, 
overall, South America is a multi-polar region. However, not all of the powers are equal.  
Kenneth Waltz’s expectation that “both friends and foes will react as countries always 
have to threatened or real predominance of one among them: they will work to right the 
balance.”6 When countries are engaged in increased defense spending, the balance of 
power in the region must be analyzed to determine whether an arms race exists in the 
region. 
The concept of balance of power has a core meaning, “That hegemonies do not 
form in multistate systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system 
generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the system.”7 Therefore, the 
increased defense spending in South America could be attributed the effort to keep power 
balanced within the region. The balance of power theory could hold true regionally 
within South America. However, although widely accepted, Waltz’s balance of power 
theory does not hold true today in a worldwide sense. Despite Russia and China 
attempting to assert themselves as world powers, there has not been widespread 
balancing behavior against United States hegemony multi-state system.  Waltz admits 
                                                 
6 Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and American Power." The National Inerest, 2000: 55-56. 
7 William C. Wohlforth, et al. "Testing the Balance-of Power Theory in World History." European 
Journal of International Relations, 2007: 155-185   
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that “the present condition of international politics is unnatural.”8 Therefore, other 
scholars have tested the balance of power theory.  
William C. Wohlforth and others test the balance of power theory in their work, 
Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in world History.9 Wohlforth shows that hegemonies 
routinely form throughout history, and that balancing is an insignificant factor when 
explaining the emergence of non-hegemonic outcomes.10 Particularly important in South 
America, Wohlforth’s analysis provides a counter point to the theory of an arms race in 
an effort to balance power in the region. Despite the potential for an arms race, other 
possible factors can be used to explain the build-up of arms in Chile and Venezuela.   
Benjamin Goldsmith analyzes the general relationship of increased wealth as well 
as domestic and interstate factors on defense spending. He “tests an extensive set of 
defense-burden data to determine the general factors that influences states’ levels of 
military spending”11 in his article “Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989.” Goldsmith 
defines defense burden as: 
a proportional measure of military expenditure based on national product. 
This measure facilitates comparison across states and over time. It is not 
affected by the currency used or by general rates of inflation. I choose to 
focus on the defense burden because it measures spending levels and 
allows meaningful cross national comparisons.12   
This definition is applicable to the defense spending in Chile and Venezuela, and 
provides a consistent and fair comparison when examining cross-country data in 
determining the extent of the arms race in South America. After analyzing a wide range 
of studies, Goldsmith found that increasing state wealth and economic growth positively 
                                                 
8 Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and American Power." The National Inerest, 2000: 56.  
9 William C. Wohlforth, et al. "Testing the Balance-of Power Theory in World History." European 
Journal of International Relations, 2007: 155-185.  
10 Ibid., 156. 
11 Benjamin Goldsmith E., "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989. Why Spend More." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 2003: 553.  
12 Ibid. 
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correlate with an increase in defense spending.13 He admits more work must be done, but 
suggests the explanation behind the results may be that “with greater resources per capita 
a state can meet the basic social welfare needs of the population and still have a larger 
proportion of income left over for defense.”14 Additionally, he suggests with good 
economic growth, “As was true with the effect of wealth, it appears here that states will 
try to buy more security when they can afford it.”15 Goldsmith also found a positive 
correlation between war and defense burden. Although there have not been any wars in 
South America during the period examined, this variable can be considered. When 
controlling for war, he found that enduring rivalry, although less robust than wealth and 
growth, is a significant factor.16 This will be an important factor when analyzing 
Venezuela. In Chávez’s view, Venezuela has several rivals, including the United States 
and Colombia, which could be a reason for Venezuela’s increased defense spending and 
possibly the basis for a regional arms race.  
Looney and Frederiksen expand the discussion on determinants of defense 
spending by looking at fifteen countries in Latin America. They found three major 
underlying reasons for defense spending: military influence, domestic resources and 
regional or internal conflicts.17  Their model identified changes in defense budgets as 
either reactions to short-term shocks or attempts by individual governments to reestablish 
a long-run balance between defense spending and some measure of economic activity, 
military influence, or regional military activity.18 Chile and Venezuela span the course of 
each of the categories, suggesting that their recent increased defense spending may be 
affected by more than one factor.   
                                                 
13 Benjamin Goldsmith E., "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989. Why Spend More." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 2003: 553. 
14 Ibid., 562. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 566. 
17 Robert E Looney and Peter C. Frederiksen. "The Effect of Declining Military Influence on Defense 
Budgets in Latin America." Armed Forces and Society, 2000: 446. 
18 Ibid., 447. 
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Recently, the mainstream media have highlighted the issue of arms buildup and 
increased defense spending in South America and raised the specter of an arms race. 
Many of the media outlets that have focused on Chile and Venezuela use a wide range of 
applicable data and first-hand interviews with experts inside and outside of the region. 
Andrew Downie, a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, recently interviewed 
Michael Shifter, the Vice President of Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue in 
Washington, who testified before Congress about Venezuela’s increased defense 
spending. Shifter argues that the motivations for increased defense spending differ across 
countries. Stating, “Chávez is using this as part of mobilizing the country and thinking of 
a possible attack from the U.S. In Chile, it is much more about giving the armed forces 
what they want.”19  
Another highly discussed topic in the media is Venezuela’s populist president 
Hugo Chávez. His military background, fiery rhetoric and constant concern for a U.S. 
invasion are additional factors that must be considered when attempting to explain 
Venezuela’s increased defense spending. Throughout his presidency, Chávez has made 
claims that the United States is a military threat to Venezuela. In June of 2006, Venezuela 
prepared for and conducted training exercises designed to thwart a U.S. invasion. 
Venezuela’s military began training exercises called “Operation Integral Defense Patriot 
Navy,” which involved commercial fishermen and other civilians to aid the Navy in 
defending the coast.20 Planning to defend Venezuela against the most advanced military 
in the world could be reason enough to justify purchasing additional high-tech military 
weapons.  
Advanced weapons only recently became available to countries in South America. 
The United States is among the leading arms providers to South America.21 However, the  
 
                                                 
19 Andrew Downie, "Is Latin America Heading for an Arms Race?" Christian Science Monitor. Jan 
16, 2008. www.csmonitor.com (accessed May 15, 2008).  
20 Clara Long, "Venezuela Spends Week Preparing for U.S. Invasion." NPR.ORG. 2006, June 11. 
21 Andrew Downie, "Is Latin America Heading for and Arms Race?" Christian Science Monitor. Jan 
16, 2008. www.csmonitor.com (accessed May 15, 2008). 
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policy toward transferring advanced arms to Latin America only became more liberalized 
until 1997 with the repeal of President Carter’s Presidential Directive 13, which severely 
limited arms sales to Latin America.  
Chile and Venezuela both claim to be modernizing and replacing old, outdated 
equipment. “Chilean authorities insist that the newly purchased warplanes, tanks, frigates 
and submarines were merely replacements for obsolete material.”22 The outdated 
equipment can be contributed to President Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Decision 
Directive 13, banning sales of U.S. attack jets and other high-tech items. “Other jet 
suppliers such as France and Sweden followed the U.S. lead and refrained from selling 
the most sophisticated equipment during the same time period.”23 “As a result, Latin 
America now has one of the world’s lowest levels of military technology.”24 
In an Airpower Journal article, Dr. Frank Mora and Lt. Col. Antonio Palá discuss 
the new policy and some of its effects on the region. Mora and Palá argue that a measured 
approach to arms sales can be beneficial to peace and security in the region.25 “Rather 
than tilting civil-military relations in favor of the armed forces, as most critics maintain, 
arms sales can be an element of a more stable relationship that can contribute to 
democratization.”26  
A potentially destabilizing force, however, is the purchase of arms by Venezuela 
from Russia. In May 2007, “Venezuela was re-certified as "not cooperating fully" with 
U.S. antiterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act.”27 As a 
result, the U.S. banned sales and licensing for the export of defense articles and services 
                                                 
 22 Alex Sanchez, "Chile's Aggressive Military Arms Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in 
Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina." COHA.org. Aug 7, 2007. www.coha.org (accessed May 15, 2008).   
23 Thomas Cardamone, "Arms Sales to Latin America." Foriegn Policy in Focus, 1997: 1-3. 
(Cardamone 1997)  
 24 Ibid. 
25Frank O. Mora and Antonio L. Palá. "U.S. Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America. Lifting the Ban 
on Fighter Aircraft." Air Power Journal, 1999:Pg 90. (Mora and Palá 1999) 
26 Ibid., 91. 
 27 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism . State Department, Washington DC: 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008.  
 8
to Venezuela, including the transfer of defense items. With the U.S. ban, Venezuela has 
looked to Russia to purchase new military equipment including fighter jets, helicopters, 
rifles and possibly submarines. “In 2005 the U.S. blocked the sale of 12 Spanish military 
planes to Venezuela that were made with U.S. technology.”28 Now, with Russia as a 
stable supplier of arms, Venezuela could become a destabilizing force in the region. 
The reactions of other countries in the region is as important as understanding the 
causes of increased defense spending. Will Chile and Venezuela’s military buildup 
destabilize the region? Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation asks the question, “Under 
what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central 
authority?”29 Axelrod presents several strategies that can promote cooperation among 
players in an iterated computer game that can be used in international relations theory. 
The strategy that prevails in each iteration of the game is called TIT for TAT. It is a 
strategy that promotes cooperation between players or countries. The basis for the 
strategy is to cooperate on the first trial and then behave as your opponents did on the 
previous trial. Axelrod’s findings can be used to predict outcomes of cooperation within 
the region. Later the conclusion of this thesis will provide a recent example of TIT for 
TAT in action. 
B. THESIS FINDINGS 
While some shock and awe media outlets would certainly prefer an arms race 
raging out of control in South America to explain the explosive increase in Chile and 
Venezuela’s defense spending, the real reason behind the increase not that shocking. The 
thought of an arms race stimulate memories of the cold war and the race to build nuclear 
weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. No such race either nuclear or 
conventional is happening in Chile, Venezuela or South America for that matter. The 
facts presented in this thesis point to a combination of the need for modernization and the 
revenues from the commodity boom to pay for it.   
                                                 
 28 BBC News. Venezuela 'to buy more weapons'. Feb 5, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4682488.stm (accessed June 12, 2008).  
29 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 2006. 
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In Chile, the military is required to purchase new equipment from copper 
revenues. Chile’s copper law provides for a direct correlation between increased copper 
prices and increased defense spending. Additionally, Chile displayed a need for new and 
updated equipment.  Together Chile’s overdue need for modern military equipment, high 
copper prices, relaxed U.S. policies Chile embarked on a massive military modernization 
effort and increased defense spending.  
The Venezuelan military benefits from the high price of oil and the belief that the 
U.S. could invade. Venezuela’s president continues to make the argument that the United 
States is a threat and the Venezuelan military needs to modernize to defend against that 
threat. Additionally, the Venezuelan military suffers from old equipment and is in need 
for new and updated hardware. As with Chile, Venezuela spent decades in the dark 
unable to adequately modernize its equipment. The benefit of high oil prices and the 
willingness of countries like Russia to provide the high tech weapons have allowed 
Venezuela defense spending spree.  
Rather than engage in an arms race many of the leaders in South America are 
working towards cooperation and collective defense pacts. Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and 
others are advocating for cooperation and mutual defense and their leaders do not see 
Chile and Venezuela’s increase defense spending as a threat. To continue this 
cooperation the best policy strategy for countries in the region to avoid conflict is to use a 
reciprocal strategy from Robert Axelrod’s Theory of Evolution called TIT for TAT.30 The 
TIT for TAT strategy has been proven to be robust in promoting cooperation by experts 
including Parks and Komorita when compared to alternative theories.31 TIT for TAT is a 
viable strategy and can be used to promote cooperation among South American countries 
despite the increased levels of defense spending. 
                                                 
30 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 2006 
31  Craig D Parks and Samuel S Komorita. "Reciprocity Research and Its Implications for the 
Negotiation Process." International Negotiation, 1998: 151-169.  
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C.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use the case study methodology and will cover the time period 
from 1990 through the present, with a particular focus on the past five year, during the 
commodity boom 2003-2008.  Based primarily on secondary sources, the thesis will 
include congressional sources from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) and 
text from testimonies before Congress.  For example, a recent Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report notes, “The total value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide 
(to both developed and developing nations) declined nearly 13 percent from the prior 
year.”32 The same report also provides a wealth of regional arms transfer data delineated 
by countries who are the leading buyers and providers of arms to developing nations. The 
data provided in the report shows historical levels of arms transfers to Latin America and 
which countries are the top providers of those arms.  
Other sources used in this thesis include periodicals, U.S. government and 
nongovernmental reports, working papers, books, and journals articles pertaining to 
general defense and military spending in Latin America, focusing on Chile and 
Venezuela.  It will also refer to official reports from governmental offices including the 
U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense as well as Chilean and Venezuelan 
government offices. The World Bank, JANE’S, and Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) databases are used to provide empirical evidence. 
                                                 
32 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005. CRS 
Report, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service-Library of Congress, 2006.  
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II. CHILE 
Since the end of the Pinochet era and the beginning of democracy in Chile, a 
number of factors are critical to determining the basis for Chile’s increased defense 
spending. Among the most important factors, civil military relations play a key role in 
determining defense budgets and military equipment procurement. Civilian oversight of 
the military in Chile is unique since the end of the Pinochet regime and is critical to the 
analysis of increased defense spending in Chile.  
Additionally, civil military relations affect other factors that help to determine 
why defense spending has increased. These factors include the possibility of Chile 
competing in a regional arms race, the need for military equipment modernization, 
additional resources from high copper prices and the specific types of military spending.  
Chile’s military leaders have remained relatively autonomous since the Pinochet 
era. While the level of civilian oversight has increased throughout the past decade, 
policies such as the copper law are still in place and play an important role on defense 
spending in Chile.      
A.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The structure of the armed forces and the power within the government is a 
critical and important factor underlying defense spending. Unlike many South American 
countries, the Chilean military has a high level of autonomy and power within the 
national government. This autonomy and power stems from the Pinochet regime, its 1980 
constitution, and 1989 reforms. “The 1980 constitution was designed to provide a 
framework of protected democracy, with limited pluralism and a tutelary role for the 
armed forces.”33 The military performed the role as a “fourth branch of government – 
                                                 
33 Claudia Heiss and Patricio Navia. Protected Democracy and Military Autonomy Trade Offs in 
Chile's Transition to Democracy. Working Paper Number 9, Institute of Instruction in Social Sciences, 
University Diego Portales, 2006.  
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guardians of the nation.”34   This role and their historically high level of autonomy is the 
basis for the continued power of the military today.  
Upon taking power via a military coup in 1973, Pinochet abolished most of the 
1925 constitution and replaced it with military decrees with the intention writing a new 
constitution. “The objective of the Junta was to restore order and return power to elected 
civilian authorities.”35 By 1980, the Junta produced a new constitution and put it in place 
in 1981. “The new constitution granted special powers to the President and the Junta that 
would serve as the legislative body.” 36 The military would maintain power during an 
eight-year transitional period upon which elections would be held to elect a new president 
and modify the constitution. During this period, the military was the guarantor of 
democratic and political order. They did this via controlling appointments to a 
constitutional tribunal, which ruled upon “whether individuals and political parties 
represented a threat to the institutions and functioning of democracy as established in the 
constitution.”37  
Additionally, in 1987, Pinochet amended the 1953 copper law. The original law 
required that 10 percent of all profits from copper sales go to the military. The 1987 
provision changed the language of the law from copper profits to copper sales, resulting 
in a larger amount of funds going to the military. This is particularly important with 
today’s high copper prices. Additionally, there was no legislative oversight and the funds 
went directly to the various armed forces in equal amounts to be used for military 
acquisitions.38  
                                                 
34 Brian Loveman, "Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin 
America, 1978-1993." Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1994: 123.  
35 Claudia Heiss and Patricio Navia. Protected Democracy and Military Autonomy Trade Offs in 
Chile's Transition to Democracy. Working Paper Number 9, Institute of Instruction in Social Sciences, 
University Diego Portales, 2006.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 7. 
38 Ibid., 20. 
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When Pinochet failed to be elected in 1988, the opposition was eager to eliminate 
many of the provisions in the Pinochet constitution, but, with the military still very 
powerful, made many concessions to military autonomy. One example is that the military 
budget has a minimum level that was set in 1989. “According to the armed forces LOC 
(#18,948) promulgated on February 22, 1990, the military budget cannot fall below the 
previous year’s budget adjusted for inflation.”39 “The constitution also deprived the 
president of the right to dismiss top military commanders and allowed the armed forces to 
nominate four of nine non-elected senators.”40 Combined with the copper law, these 
policies gave the military a high level of power and autonomy over defense spending. 
It has been eighteen years since the rule of the Junta, and part, but not all, of the 
aforementioned powers are still in place. As many of the old Pinochet guard retired, some 
long-held powers and laws have been changing. In 2004, the equal distribution clause of 
the copper law was modified; now the Defense Ministry decides on how to allocate the 
revenues of copper resources to each of the services.41 More importantly, the 
constitutional revisions of 2005 “abolished the position of appointed senator, and restored 
the president’s power to fire the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and the 
uniformed police.”42 Although there have been discussions about changes to the copper 
law, no serious attempts to change it have been put forward. “Given the law's mandate as 
well as the present situation of a region in flux, the government has chosen to adopt a 
theme of continuity for the immediate future”43 — leaving the copper law unlikely to be 
changed. 
                                                 
39 Claudia Heiss and Patricio Navia. Protected Democracy and Military Autonomy Trade Offs in 
Chile's Transition to Democracy. Working Paper Number 9, Institute of Instruction in Social Sciences, 
University Diego Portales, 2006. 20.  
40 Oxford Analytica. Chile: F-16 Order Exposes Defense Spending Problems. OxResearch Feb 11, 
Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd., 2002.  
41 Ibid., 24. 
42 Human Rights Watch. "Human Rights Overview. Chile." HRW.org. 2004.  
43 Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization: Budget-driven Downsizing in Latin America." Journal 
of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 1994: 37-57.    
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B.  DEFENSE SPENDING 
Chile’s defense spending increased by 49.9 percent between 2003 and 2006, 
shown in Figure 1.44 2006 military expenditures totaled over 4.8 billion dollars (US).45 
The 2007 actual expenditures are expected to be even higher due to the high copper 
prices that year. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), 3.6 percent of the gross domestic product was spent on defense. This is among 
the highest levels of defense burden in South America.46 
 
 
Figure 1.   SIPRI Defense Spending Data for Chile (2005 US$).47 
 
“An earlier study concluded that Chile spent more per capita on the military than 
any other country in Latin America: $90.88 (US) per inhabitant.”48  Based on the current 
population, that number is much higher. The CIA reports Chile’s population at nearly 
16.5 million inhabitants and SIPRI reports 2007 defense expenditures at 4.8 billion, 
which equates to almost $300 (US) per person spent on defense. As a point of reference, 
Brazil, with a larger defense budget and much larger population, spends just under 80 
                                                 
44 Oxford Analytica. Latin America: Arms Purchases Rise Along With Growth. Oxresearch Feb 04, 
Oxford: Oxforn Analytica, 2008. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 2008.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Study referred to in Rohter, Larry. "Chile Copper Windfall Forces Hard Choices on Spending." 
New York Times, Jan 7, 2007: 1. 3.  
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dollars per person on defense.49 The point here is that Chile has dramatically increased its 
defense spending since 2003. More telling is defense spending as a percentage of GDP. 
Chile’s budget allocates 3.6 percent of its gross domestic product toward defense and 
Brazil only 1.5 percent. 
C.  WHY INCREASED CHILEAN DEFENSE SPENDING? 
The empirical data on defense burden shows a definite upward trend in defense 
spending. Of the three theories analyzed, the first relies on the existence of an arms race 
in South America and Chile’s purchases are keeping in step with other military powers in 
the region such as Venezuela and Brazil. Chile also benefits the explosive increase in 
copper prices linking it to the current commodities boom theory. Chile is also in need of 
military modernization after years of being denied access to high tech equipment; such a 
modernization is said to be necessary for the military to respond to the threats facing the 
country. 
D.  ARMS RACE 
Chile has not been involved in a major war since the War of the Pacific, well over 
one hundred years ago. Chile has, however, been involved in a number of border disputes 
and smaller conflicts in recent years. Although relations are improving, Chile has had 
tenuous relations with Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. “Peru and Chile vehemently disagree 
over their territorial and maritime border, while many Peruvians and Bolivians still hold a 
grudge over the immense amount of Bolivian territory lost to Chile during the War of the 
Pacific.”50 Although most border conflicts have been solved between Chile and 
Argentina, relations in the past have been volatile, due mostly to border disputes in the 
southern islands and the southern continental glaciers areas, which could be rich in 
natural resources. Despite past or current differences, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina 
are all poles in a multi polar region. 
                                                 
49 Per Capita dollar amounts are expressed in US 2005 dollars based on the data provided by SIPRI 
and the CIA Fact book. 
50 Alex Sanchez, "Chile's Aggressive Military Arms Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in 
Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina." COHA.org. Aug 7, 2007. www.coha.org (accessed May 15, 2008).  
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South America is a multi-polar region, one in which no one country is the 
hegemony. While South America can presumptively rely on the United States for 
collective defense of threats external to the region, the United States is less likely to get 
involved in regional conflicts.51 Therefore, the United States can be discounted as a 
regional hegemony in this case. Brazil dominates the region in territory, population and 
defense expenditure, and has the most capable military. However, “South America is 
viewed in the context of a continental hegemonic vacuum.”52 When countries are 
engaged in an arms race, the balance of power in the region must be analyzed to 
determine whether an arms race exists. The concept of balance of power has a core 
meaning, “That hegemonies do not form in multistate systems because perceived threats 
of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the 
system.”53  Using this definition, Chile and other countries in South America would 
increase their defense capabilities and thus defense spending to achieve balance in the 
system. Chile, Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil have all 
increased their defense spending since 2003.54 While Chile and Venezuela lead in the 
largest percentage increase in defense burden, nearly every country in the region has 
increased its defense spending. Based on the Wohlforth’s premise and the evidence 
presented, South America could be in the throes of a regional arms race. “While it is 
acknowledged that the external environment has changed in the wake of the Cold War, 
the contention is that changes in the regional balance have yet to be consolidated.”55 
“Moreover, the military perceives new threats to the regional balance, like the equipment 
entering the region via counternarcotics assistance, as increasing the need for 
                                                 
 51 This is based on the United States’ pre-occupation with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and would 
likely promote diplomatic methods to solving disputes between countries within the region.   
 52 Augusto Varas, Brazil in South America: from indifference to hegemony. Madrid: Fundación para 
las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2008.  
 53 William C. Wohlforth, et al. "Testing the Balance-of Power Theory in World History." European 
Journal of International Relations, 2007: 155-185.   
54 Oxford Analytica. Latin America: Arms Purchases Rise Along With Growth. Oxresearch Feb 04, 
Oxford: Oxforn Analytica, 2008. 4-5.  
55 Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization: Budget-driven Downsizing in Latin America." Journal 
of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 1994: 49. 
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modernization and acquisition at home.”56 Arms race or not, Chile could not have 
increased to its current level of defense spending without copper. 
E.  COMMODITIES BOOM 
Since 2003, the world price of copper has set all-time records and continues to 
maintain high price levels amid strong demand from developing nations such as Chile 
and Venezuela. Copper is Chile’s number one export and generated over 14 billion 
dollars in revenues in 2007.57 Copper revenues are by far Chile’s most important single 
contributor to the economy. Over 8 percent of GDP comes in the form of copper 
revenues.58 Copper prices have increased dramatically between 2003 and the present. 
Shown in Figure 2, copper has nearly quadrupled in price. From below one dollar per 
pound in 2003, it has flirted with four dollars per pound several times in the past few 
years and has been between two and three dollars per pound through September 2008.59 
 
Figure 2.   Copper Price/lb 2003-2008.60 
 
                                                 
56 Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization: Budget-driven Downsizing in Latin America." Journal 
of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 1994: 49. 
57 Calculated based on the copper revenues that went to the armed forces of $1.4 billion (US) in 2007.  
58 Calculated using data from the CIA Fact Book. 
59 MetalPrices.com. Free web charts. June 19, 2008. 
http://www.metalprices.com/pubcharts/Public/Copper_Price_Charts.asp (accessed June 19, 2008).  
60 MetalPrices.com. Free web charts. June 19, 2008. 
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Goldsmith found that state wealth and economic growth positively correlate with 
increased defense burden.61 Along with his findings, he suggests the explanation behind 
the results may be that “with greater resources per capita a state can meet the basic social 
welfare needs of the population and still have a larger proportion of income left over for 
defense.”62 This is particularly true in Chile due to the Copper Law. Additionally, he 
suggests, with good economic growth, “As was true with the effect of wealth, it appears 
here that states will try to buy more security when they can afford it.”63 Not only can 
Chile afford to increase spending on defense, it must, according to the constitution. The 
copper law requires that 10 percent of all copper revenues go to the armed forces to be 
used for military acquisitions.64 Therefore, defense spending will continue to increase as 
long as the price of copper increases. 
F.  MODERNIZATION 
With the extra funds from high-priced copper, the Chilean military is taking the 
opportunity to get new equipment. In fact, the Chilean military claims the copper funds 
are necessary to replace and modernize old, outdated equipment. “Chilean authorities 
insist that the newly purchased warplanes, tanks, frigates and submarines were merely 
replacements for obsolete material.”65 Additionally, Chile is restructuring the way it 
plans to fight in the future. “Chile is well into a wide-ranging defense modernization 
program involving equipment procurement for all three services and significant shifts in  
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62 Ibid., 562. 
63 Ibid.  
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University Diego Portales, 2006. 20.   
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doctrine, organization and training.”66 “Its intent is to produce a modern, integrated joint 
force able to satisfy national priorities and participate in U.N.-sanctioned international 
operations.”67 
To achieve this goal, Chile has “downsized its military from 120,000 to 40,000 
and it reorganized and created eight brigades, giving priority to mobility and 
firepower.”68 However, while the troop reduction phase of the plan was a success. The 
second phase of the plan, modernization, is now in progress. Chile and other South 
American countries were prohibited from purchasing advanced weapons from the United 
States and many of its allies. South American countries’ defense spending dropped by an 
average of 35.2 percent between 1985 and 1990 and, in Chile, the drop was even more 
dramatic.69 While Chile did make some equipment purchases, it was forced to acquire an 
ill-assorted collection of military hardware until the Carter era Presidential Decision 
Directive 13, banning sales of U.S. attack jets and other high-tech items, was repealed by 
President Clinton in 1997.70 Additionally, poor coordination between the services in the 
past resulted in “conflicting purchasing policies”71 including reduced efficiency and less 
capability per dollar spent.  
Experts say, “Both the Chilean Air Force and Navy urgently require new 
hardware.”72 Prior to lifting the ban, their fighter jet fleet and three frigate warships were 
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going out of service and becoming obsolete.73  To support new fighter aircraft, Chile has 
only one B-707 tanker for refueling and is in desperate need for more.74 Also, the Air 
Force lacked a combat search and rescue platform — and only 25 percent of its UH-1H 
helicopter fleet is operational at any one time.75 The army and navy are both in similar 
shape. After dramatically reducing its size, the army is shedding antique equipment for 
newer models that will support a more lethal and agile force.76 The navy’s submarine 
force is operating with 1980s-built submarines that have reached the end of their lifespan, 
and operating surface ships that it can no longer logistically support.77 
G.  TYPES OF DEFENSE SPENDING 
The Chilean armed forces have made significant progress in its modernization 
goals since the lifting of the high-tech weapons ban. Each of the armed services have 
either purchased or plan to purchase new fighter jets, tankers, combat helicopters, search 
and rescue planes, early warning systems, warships (both surface and submarines and 
associated weapons systems), maritime helicopters, tanks, multiple rocket systems, 
armored personnel carriers, and a fleet of new trucks including heavy equipment 
transporters.78 Other equipment purchases or upgrades could come as necessary.  
Chile has a relatively transparent defense budget process. The Ministry of 
Defense has published the Book of National Defense of Chile on an unclassified level for 
both internal and external groups to view and analyze. Although Chile’s defense 
expenditures have included a wide range of new and updated equipment, most of its 
annual budget goes to personnel. In the Chilean defense budget, over 50 percent goes to 
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personnel and 40 percent of that goes to pay pensions.79 Other than to personnel, the rest 
of the budgetary pie goes to ordnance (22.81 percent), operation (20.89 percent), and 
infrastructure (2.67 percent).80 In general, for 2002, the Chilean Armed Forces were 
operating equipment that was in the final stages of its useful life, so they have a 
comparatively high maintenance cost.81 With a high level of transparency, other countries 
in the region can know the general levels of defense spending and overall national 
defense policy. Like in Chile, Venezuela benefited from high commodity prices, but the 
factors surrounding Venezuela tell a different story. 
H.  CONCLUSION 
The Chilean military increased its defense spending dramatically from 2003 to 
2008. While some experts are concerned about a regional arms race, this is not the 
Chilean rational for the increased spending. Despite the lack of potential threats, the 
Chilean had been concerned about the state of its military hardware. Chile’s military has 
suffered from the inability to upgrade, repair and replace its old and outdated military 
hardware. The President Carter-era ban on arms sales to the region left Chile to make do 
with second-hand, broken-down equipment. With the repeal of the ban in 1997, Chile 
almost immediately began the procurement process.  It was not, however, until the price 
of copper began its climb in 2003 that the Chilean military began seriously ramping up its 
defense spending. 
Additionally, the copper law required the military to procure new equipment with 
the addition copper revenues. With the combination of the need to modernize its forces 
and the availability of resources to fund the purchases, the Chilean military was able to 
go on a spending spree. The reason for the dramatic increase in defense spending lies 
with the fact that much of Chile’s military equipment was out of commission and in  
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desperate need of modernizing. With the tripling of copper prices during the commodity 
boom Chile was able to replace much of its equipment the same way industrialized 








Like the Pinochet regime’s significant impact on the Chilean military, another 
former military member-turned-president is dramatically impacting all aspects of his 
country, its politics and therefore its military. President Hugo Chávez has been a 
polarizing force in Venezuela and has changed the state of affairs in his country since his 
landslide election in 1998. 
Since his accession into office, there have been a number of radical changes made 
to the government, including a new constitution, civil military relations, economic 
policies and other populist initiatives. These changes must be considered when analyzing 
the three theories for increased defense spending. A country in flux, Venezuela is 
inserting itself as a leader in the region. Venezuela is not in the midst of an arms race in 
South America, and Venezuela’s purchases are keeping in step with other military 
powers in the region such as Chile and Brazil.  However, a more likely theory links the 
additional spending to the explosive increase in oil prices due to the current commodity 
boom. President Chávez’s policies have benefited from all-time high oil prices and he has 
been able to support many of his populist initiatives with oil revenues. A third theory 
points to the need for military modernization after years of being denied access to high-
tech equipment. Such modernization is said to be necessary for the military to respond to 
the threats facing the country.  
A. THE CHÁVEZ ERA 
The reign of the Chávez government has introduced a number of radical changes 
not only in the constitution of Venezuela but also in the way of life of Venezuelan 
politics.  The changes that have been introduced since Chávez took office create an 
impression of criticism and doubt in terms of the future direction of the country as a 
friend or foe in the region.  
Looney and Frederiksen’s work is particularly useful in Venezuela. They found 
three major underlying reasons for defense spending: military influence, domestic 
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resources and regional or internal conflicts.82 Their model identified changes in defense 
budgets as either: reactions to short-term shocks or attempts by individual governments to 
reestablish a long run balance between defense spending and some measure of economic 
activity, military influence, or regional military activity.83 Therefore, before delving into 
the details of Venezuela’s defense spending, it is important to understand the dynamic 
factors that have forced the changes — both present and future — brought to Venezuela 
by Hugo Chávez. These include changes to the Venezuelan constitution and also the 
potential for additional constitutional reforms that Chávez is likely to continue to 
advance. Additionally, major economic issues of the country — such as oil production, 
rate of government spending, taxes, inflation rates, central bank reforms, state-owned 
enterprises, and  other reforms —  will affect the economic stability of the country.   
The cost of increasing levels of defense can be high enough to keep the most 
advanced weapons out of the reach of many countries around the world. The delicate 
balancing act of ensuring the basic functions of government and the security of the nation 
can be difficult to manage. Hugo Chávez is engaged in an economic balancing act of his 
own. On one hand, Chávez has promised to spread Venezuela’s oil wealth to the masses, 
protect his country from a possible invasion, and increase social programs, all while 
keeping inflation low. On the other hand, this comes at the expense of further 
development of the country’s natural resources. This is a difficult task for any nation, 
especially one heavily reliant upon the volatile price oil.   
Chávez’s changes have not come without criticisms. The government has been 
cutting the PDVSA development and sustainment budget and diverting those funds to 
social programs directed for the masses.  Scholars argue that such a move on the end of 
the Chávez administration would eventually take a toll in terms of its oil production 
competitiveness and eventually cause instability in oil production and oil prices 
ultimately impacting Venezuelans and the international market.  As such, it is with this  
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respect that the populist stance of President Chávez is viewed as something that could 
significantly affect not only Venezuela’s economic growth but also that of its neighboring 
countries as well. 
1.  Venezuela’s New Constitution 
Due to its growing instability, the Venezuelan democracy has been highly 
criticized. The people viewed political parties as the main determinants of the failure of 
the former political system, hence the introduction of a new government that puts 
emphasis on strengthening citizen's rights and civil societies84. The triumph of the former 
coup leader, Chávez, who received approval from 56 percent of the total voter 
population, could be attributed to the Venezuelans' disillusionment over various 
politicians who have squandered the country’s oil wealth with inefficient governance and 
corruption.  As such, the cornerstone of Chávez' success was criticizing the dominant 
elite class and the poor management of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).85 
When Chávez took office, he had dramatically altered the Venezuelan 
Constitution and even introduced a new name for the country — the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela.  As such, the new government revamped political institutions by removing 
the Senate and erecting a unicameral National Assembly, which lengthens the term of the 
president from five to six years.86    
President Chávez, however, did not merely stop on a dramatic paradigm shift of 
the entire Venezuelan government and politics. He also attempted to address other 
constitutional reforms that he perceived as relevant for the current state of affairs of the 
society and the economy.  On August 15, 2007, the president proposed reforms for the 
1999 Constitution, which aimed to change the way in which the marginalized are treated. 
He wanted the Venezuelan constitution to provide quicker help for the poor. 
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Additionally, the President aimed to widen citizen participation in the democratic 
process; hence, the so-called "Socialism for the 21st Century.”  This type of government 
framework looks into the relevance of "participatory democracy, mixed economy, 
meeting the country's social needs and promoting a multi-polar world.”87 
The constitutional reform brought a number of significant changes including the 
president's length of service, more respect to voter preferences in terms of selecting their 
president, economic reforms, central bank reforms, political-territorial reforms, and 
military reforms.88 Additionally, President Chávez is looking forward to the 
nationalization of the energy sector and the reduction of the common workday to six 
hours.89 
2.  The Constitution and Economic Policies 
The economic reforms in the country focused more on the diversification of 
business enterprises and social welfare. The Venezuelan constitution allows citizens to 
participate freely in any economic activity; closely related to this, the government is also 
geared toward the promotion of private enterprises that will assure the fair distribution of 
wealth throughout society.90   
The foundation of the government's economic reform is centered on the integral 
development of the country and an economic system that is highly focused on 
diversification and independence.  The relevance of "human values of cooperation" and 
promotion of "general interest" is highly regarded.  In this respect, President Chávez is 
looking forward to an economy that is healthy with private enterprises, social orientation, 
cooperation and community centricity. 
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Article 113 of the constitution prohibits economic monopolies and the 
concentration of power and resources to small groups.  It drives the government to 
effectively protect the society and other community-based activities, and would allow the 
aforementioned to make use of the country’s economic resources for the sake of the 
greater good.  On the other hand, private corporations are also allowed to maximize the 
use of Venezuela's natural resources, although they are required to operate in conjunction 
with the government's policies and laws and other government enterprises. In relation to 
this, Article 115 focuses on the relevance of private property for the welfare of the public.  
Such a reform centers on the notion of the basic right of every citizen to own private 
properties in correlation to certain qualifications determined by the government.91   
According to Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in certain cases 
wherein a property is:  
(1) Public, that is fully owned and managed by the government; (2) Social, 
that is lands which are under the management of government or the 
citizens; (3) Collective, or the lands that are owned and managed by a 
certain groups of people; and finally (4) Mixed, or lands which are a 
combination of ownership and management; private institutions or 
corporations may not be allowed to acquire the said lands.92   
3.  Populist Initiatives 
Populism is a political phenomenon wherein politicians draw masses of new 
voters to a particular ideology, which is that of nationalism and cultural pride.  Most 
politicians who are inclined to the populist orientation promised people a better life than 
they would normally draw in the working and middle classes. However, even wealthy 
and powerful citizens are also joining the populist’s cause due to an underlying notion 
that populist ideology would serve well on the aforementioned interests and national 
destiny.93    
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In relation to this, it is significant to note that most political populist exhibit a 
charisma (i.e., special personal qualities and talents) that in one way or another empowers 
them to further the interest of the masses and uphold national dignity. The populist 
movement in Venezuela started in the 1920s and 1930s with Rómulo Betancourt when he 
led a student revolt that attempted to oust the dictatorial regime of Juan Vicente Gómez.94 
The populist movement of President Chávez started with his desire to deal with 
the extreme poverty that the masses were experiencing, initially without necessarily 
undertaking a radical distribution of wealth that would affect foreign investment and put 
the middle and the upper class in an unfavorable position.95    
In most countries that cater to a populist ideology, rural poverty and lack of 
development is rampant. Such an occurrence paved the way for the marginalized to 
transfer to urban areas to look for work. However, due to continued poverty, certain 
portions of the cities have turned into urban slums, with the government having very 
limited resources to cater to their needs.   
In order to cater to these concerns, Chávez has made a number of social initiatives 
to alleviate the disposition of the poor. Food and first aid programs were given to the 
flood victim in Caracas in 2002. He also raised of the minimum wage of government 
employees and educators by 20 percent, and also found revenue sources other than oil 
taxes.96    
4.  Oil Production 
The economic growth of Venezuela could be highly associated with its oil 
production industry.  The original "Oil Boom" in the 1970s and the early 1980' paved the 
                                                 
94 Michael Conniff, Populism in Latin America. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999.  
95 Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chavez Phenomenon: Political Change in 
Venezuela." Third World Quarterly, 2003: 63-76. 
96 Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, 2003. The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in 
Venezuela. Third World Quarterly 24 63-76. 
 29
way for the country to survive Latin America’s sharp downturn in its economy.97  
Venezuela has been highly dependent on the oil revenues of the country in order to 
sustain its economy and shape political attitudes and various social values.98   
When Chávez assumed his office in 1999, the price of oil in the world market had 
dropped substantially.  In order to attend to such concern, the administration assumed a 
proactive role to stabilize the price of oil in the world market.  In order to achieve this, 
President Chávez forged a consensus with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Counties (OPEC) while, at the same time, enhancing the role of the Ministry of Mines 
with the Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) administration.  Such an act by the 
government has paved the way to an immediate conflict with the bureaucracy of the oil 
conglomerates.99   
Due to the new constitution that was introduced in 1999 and the special laws 
enacted by the president in 2001, the country was placed on a collision course with the 
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state-owned oil company.  In effect, the 
government has made a total overhaul of how the oil industry is managed, and made it as 
something that is "democratized.”  The management of the oil was removed from the 
hands of the experts and made into something that could be subjected to the criticisms of 
the people.  As such, the issues with regard to the Venezuelan oil became a matter of 
public political discourse.100  The control of the PDVSA has caused much conflict with 
the top managers of the PDVSA, due to the diversion of petroleum funds to a number of 
social programs.101    
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Considering the conflict, President Chávez took control of the manner in which 
taxes are collected.  The Chávez government has instructed PDVSA to spend roughly 
$4.4 billion out of its $19.5 billion budget on social programs.  Such an act by the 
government caused PSVSA to decline in terms of its productivity and direct most of its 
funds to the Fondo Nacional Del Desarollo (Fonden), the government’s national 
development fund.102  Most critics argue that such a move is something that could be 
viewed as inefficient use of revenues.     
The Chávez government has also been underestimating the capital needs of the 
country by awarding oil service contracts on the sole basis of ideology and political 
motivations.  This also led the way to decreased production of oil, despite the country 
having one of the biggest oil reserves.  Based on its natural resources, the country has 
proved its capacity to be one of the major players in the international market. Yet, despite 
its 79.7 billion barrels of proven conventional oil reserves, 151 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, and roughly 270 billion barrels of reserves of extra-heavy oil in the Orinoco 
Belt, its production has been steadily decreasing.  “When Chávez took office in the 
government, PDVSA was able to create 3.3 million bbl/d while private oil companies 
only contributed 200,000 bbl/d and, currently, PDVSA capacity is a dismal 1.8 million 
bbd/d."103   
The changing oil policies of the Chávez administration led the way for 
Venezuela's oil sector to fall behind in terms of its "technology, capital, and 
experience.”104  The revenues from Venezuela’s oil have been steadily going down since 
2005.  Such a disposition for the economic sector is something that could translate on the 
macro level, as the aforementioned accounts for more than three-quarters of total export 
revenues of the country.  Figure 3 reveals that revenues from oil exports have steadily 
declined as a result of the decrease in petroleum exports since 1998 when President 
Chávez took office.   
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Figure 3.   Venezuelan Oil Exports. 
From: Banco Central de Venezuela 2003 as cited from Coupal 2003.105 
 
One of the major consumers of the Venezuelan oil is the United States, 
accounting for about 12 percent of the total crude oil import of the country.  As such, 68 
percent of the total oil productions are intended for the USA; because of this, in 2006 
alone, the total exports of the country to the USA amounted to $37.2 billion, having oil 
products take $35.1 billion of the share or amounting to 94 percent of the total percentage 
of all exports.  The increase of the price of oil in the global market has highly benefited 
the Chávez government, hence, leading the way to increase the country’s revenues and 
government expenditures for anti-poverty and other social programs.106 
Despite of this relationship, however, a notable friction in terms of bilateral 
relations exists between Venezuela and the United States.  There were times when 
President Chávez threatened that he will stop selling oil to the United States.  In addition, 
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the president also threatened that he would destroy the oil fields if the U.S. were to 
attack. President Chávez also stated that the supply of oil would be cut if America tried to 
remove him from office.  Such statements on the part of the government have caused 
numerous speculations about the reliability of Venezuela as a major supplier of oil.  On 
the other hand, attempts by the Venezuelan government to tap the Chinese market have 
been viewed as an act that aims to replace the U.S. market.107  
5.  Government Spending 
More than just poor strategic use of PDVSA funds, a number of criticisms have 
also arisen due to the government’s stand on how the citizens should make use of their 
electricity.  According to Deering, the state's "consumer-oriented energy subsidies" 
indeed serve the citizens well, since it keeps the prices low; albeit, such an act fosters a 
frame of mind that the over-consumption of electricity is a conventional act, thus making 
Venezuela one of the highest consumers of electricity in South America.108   
In addition, Venezuela has used its human capital ineffectively.  When President 
Chávez took office, he expressed his inclination to overhaul the current state of affairs of 
the state.  When he initially tried to reform the state oil company, he experienced a 
significant degree of resistance from many within the company.  When the 
aforementioned individuals participated in the 2002–2003 strike, President Chávez fired 
most of them (i.e., 20,000 of the company’s 45,000 employees).109   
Other than the inefficient use of its electrical power, the country has been steadily 
increasing its expenditures for the past eight years; however, contrary to the claims of 
inefficient government spending, the Chávez government has been using much of its 
revenues from the oil sector to fund health care, food and education.  Since 1998, the 
Chávez government has been spending a lot on health care, subsidized food, and 
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education; the state oil's company funded the said social projects amounting to $13.3 
billion in 2006.   Table 1 shows the rate of increase of government spending in order to 
cater to the needs of the poor. 
Table 1.   Venezuela Central Government Social Spending.  
 
From: Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007)110 
One of the major social projects of the Chávez government involved 
improvements in health care, wherein there has been an increase of more than 18,000 
primary health care physicians since 1998.  Nine years ago, there were only 1,628 
physicians for a total of 23.4 million patients; however, at present, there are already 
19,571 physicians for a population of 27 million.  The number of emergency rooms has 
also grown, from 417 in 1998 to 721 at present.  Rehabilitation centers have surged from 
74 to 445 and the primary care centers have increased from 1,628 to 8,628 at present.  
People have also been receiving specialty care, such as eye operations, since 2004 
(399,662) and antiretroviral treatment for HIV patients (18,538 in 2006 compared to 335 
in 1999). 
The people's access to food was also significantly improved by the Chávez 
administration.  Last year, 15,726 stores all over Venezuela offered goods at subsidized 
prices that would allow a consumer to save 39 percent, as compared to 2005, which 
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allowed consumers to save only 27 percent.  Additionally, there are also various social 
programs that are made for the marginalized such as soup kitchens and food 
distribution.111 
The status of education systems has also improved significantly. The number of 
students in Bolivarian Schools, or those that cater to primary education, rose to 1,098,489 
for the 2005-2006 school years, in comparison with the 271,593 for the 1999-2000 school 
years. In addition to this, over one million adults participated in the government’s literacy 
program.112 
Due to the government policies, the poverty rate in Venezuela has significantly 
decreased from 55.1 percent in 2003 to 30.4 percent in 2006.  As such, the Chávez 
government social programs have led to a decrease in the poverty rate to 31 percent.  
Additionally, the unemployment rate has also dropped from 18.4 percent in June 2003 to 
8.3 percent in June 2007, which is the lowest within the past decade.  Significant 
increases in terms of jobs availability within the private sector are evident.  There has 
been an increase of 1.9 million jobs within the private corporations and 478 thousand 
jobs for the public sector since President Chávez took office.113  However, no matter 
how grand these social developments for Venezuela have been, critics have been very 
wary of how the government has been increasing its expenditures for the past few years.  
The Venezuelan economic boom could be directly correlated to the success of its oil 
sector; however, such is already in the process of collapse.  Venezuela's increase in 
spending is evident in Table 1, although a very conservative budget in terms of its oil 
production is expected to slow the economy from its very rapid pace.  A hypothetical 
scenario, for instance, would be a drop in oil prices that would cause the country to go 
beyond its targeted expenditure for the year, hence affecting its reforms, social policies 
and other plans.114 For example, as of early November 2008, the price of oil had fallen by 
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50 percent from its all-time high in July that same year. Now Chávez is tightening the 
belts of bureaucrats. Chávez told officials, “they can look forward to fewer expensive 
SUVs, top-of-the-line mobile telephones and whiskey-fueled parties next year.”115 
Finance Minister Ali Rodriguez said, “Venezuela's 2009 budget will have significant 
restrictions compared to this year's US$63.9 billion plan, as President Hugo Chávez's 
government keeps a close watch on slumping international oil prices.”116 
6. Inflation Rates 
One major criticism on the economic trend in Venezuela is its rapidly growing 
economy due to the oil boom.  The rising inflation of the country is hypothesized to soon 
spin out of control.  Since Venezuela has been spending at in an increasing rate, it is 
highly possible that the rising inflation of the country will bloom into a hyperinflation 
that would cause the aforementioned to a "sharp contraction in order o avoid or reduce 
dangerous levels of inflation.117 
Figure 4 shows that the country's inflation has been declining from May 1998 to 
January 2002, dropping from 40 percent to 12 percent.  Inflation increased sharply due to 
the government instability from February 2002 to February 2003, which includes the 
military coup and the oil strike.  After the strikes, the inflation then went down again and 
stabilized for more than three years.  In 2006, there was another increase in inflation that 
resulted in increased inflation from 10.4 percent to 19.4 percent in June of this year.118  
The rising inflation in Venezuela has been primarily due to the shortages of 
supplies, including food, and other related shortages that are brought by its rapid 
economic development. However, some scholars argue that the increasing inflation in 
Venezuela is something that should not be viewed as very disturbing. The Venezuelan 
government has a substantial amount of reserves in offshore accounts to offset the social 
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spending effects on inflation. Also, the inflation rate in Venezuela could not be compared 
to that of the United States or Europe, since the inflation rate during the Chávez 
government is significantly lower compared to that of 1996.  Relative to past eras, the 
inflation rate is low and had been stabilizing at 19.4 percent as of March 2007.  The 
government has been working to control the inflation, as evident on the reduction of the 
value added tax.119  
 
Figure 4.   Monthly Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (January 1991–June 2007).   
 
From: Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007)120 
 
As mentioned above, Venezuela is using its large current account surplus to help 
sterilize the effects and to control the inflation.  Sterilization is an act wherein the 
government takes "excess domestic currency out of circulation by issuing bonds.”  Also, 
country’s the account surplus can also be used to diffuse inflation through imports.  The 
excess domestic currency could be converted into dollars and be spent on imports.  This, 
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however, is a delicate balancing act because the reduced supply of bolivars increases their 
value and makes imports artificially cheap and exports expensive, and it puts enormous 
pressure on non-oil exports. This pressure will force non-oil exporters out of business and 
further the reliance on oil. In Figure 5, it can be seen that international reserves for 
Venezuela increases directly as the price of oil increases. This leaves Venezuela 
vulnerable to oil as its single export and its volatile prices. 
  
Figure 5.   International Reserves of Venezuela and Oil Prices. 
 
From: Coupal 2003.121 
7.  Tax Policies 
Various changes in tax policies were implemented during the Chávez 
administration.  Foremost is the collection of non-oil taxes on businesses.  The non-oil 
tax revenue increased to 12 percent of GDP in 2006, in comparison to 10 percent of GDP 
in 1999.122 
The government has also created tax policies aimed at large landholders, 
including landholders who own more than 5,000 hectares of land, affecting an estimated 
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300 owners all over the country. Critics argue that such an initiative aims primarily to 
have the owners sell off their land or have it confiscated for overdue taxes.  Furthermore, 
it is expected that these lands, once transferred to the government, would be used for 
subsistence farming for the marginalized.  This Chávez government tax policy is unusual, 
compared to the tax incentives given in the United States and Europe for 
overproduction.123    
8.  Central Bank Reforms 
The Central Bank of Venezuela is one of the major institutions that play a vital 
role for the advancement of Venezuela.  The institution sets various monetary policies 
and interest rates.  In order for the country to actualize its developmental goals, the 
Chávez government is looking to revise Article 318 to limit the Central Bank’s autonomy 
by combining it with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and 
Development.  Under this plan, the bank would be required to work on certain policies, 
together, with the goal of economic growth and development.124   
Central Bank reforms would limit the bank's autonomy and, at the same time, put 
the reserves of the country in the hands of both the executive branch and the bank. In 
such a manner, the proposed changes inculcates within the system the checks-and-
balances approach of most democratic institutions.125  The Embassy of the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela perceives that such a change of the Central Bank would produce 
investments, develop infrastructures, finance social programs, and advance endogenous 
and humanistic development.126  Central Bank reforms would create a totally new 
institution as the aforementioned are often viewed as offices that set high interest rates 
and various policies that overvalued the currency and led to a difficult process of 
borrowing and investing.  In the long run, such processes for the Central Bank would 
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further limit Venezuela’s economic growth and, paradoxically, would make the country's 
imports artificially inexpensive and exports more costly.127   
9.  Civil Military Relations 
One very vital change that Chávez introduced in the Venezuelan political system 
is the role of the military.  President Chávez has broadened the aforementioned's power 
by assuring that the country's sovereignty and independence is always present.  The 
Reserves in the military are called the "Popular Bolivarian Militia" and are those who 
constitute the fifth official component of the armed forces.  In addition, with this, the new 
reforms introduced by President Chávez allow him to declare any Venezuelan territory to 
be a special military zone for strategic defense purposes.128  
Venezuela has a rich history and benefited from a long period of consolidated 
democracy and civilian control over the armed forces from 1959 – 1974. From 1974 
through 1998, civilian presidents reduced the amount of attention directed toward the 
armed forces and they began losing control over the military. Lack of civilian control 
over the military was highlighted by the 1992 coup d’état attempt orchestrated by then Lt. 
Col. Hugo Chávez. Despite his failure to take control over the government through other 
than democratic means, he later went on to win the presidency via elections in 1998. 
Since his election, Venezuela's military has become an active participant in the country's 
social development and delivery of public services.129 
As president, Chávez has been a major change agent in Venezuela and the 
military has been at his side often tasked with implementing changes within the 
government. Shortly after his election, Chávez dramatically altered the checks and 
balances of civilian control over the military.  “Upon coming to power in 1998, Chávez 
led a sweeping effort to dismantle and replace the democratic institutions that had been 
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established in 1958, often relying upon the armed forces to implement and support his 
agenda for change.”130 Additionally, Chávez deliberately dismantled civilian controls of 
the military and greatly expanded the roles of military officers in the new government.131 
Upon taking office, Chávez propelled the military into the political lime light. “He relied 
upon active and retired military officers to perform civilian political and administrative 
functions and intervened directly in officer promotions and assignments as well as 
redirected military roles and missions from national defense to internal security and 
development.”132  These roles and missions were solidified in the new 1999 constitution. 
The new constitution granted special powers to the military and expanded its 
jurisdictional boundaries. Under the new constitution, the armed forces play a significant 
role in the state, with little legislative oversight over the military's budget, and 
procurement practices.133 With little budgetary oversight, the revolutionary members of 
the armed forces who hold many of the political positions within the government now 
have billions of petro dollars at their disposal for increased defense spending. 
10.  Economic Policies and Economic Stability 
The reforms initiated by President Chávez from the time that he took his seat as 
President up to the present and the direction he is taking the country is viewed by most 
scholars as something that is very disturbing. Most critics claim that Chávez is planning 
to create an authoritarian government and dominate its neighboring countries. Some also 
speculated that he has already replaced the multiparty democracy with a political system 
that only centers on the actualization of his ideals, more of a cult of his ego.  His 
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inclination towards Fidel Castro and Cuba is also a significant factor that must be 
considered in assessing his true motives.134 
The proposed constitutional changes of President Chávez has been widely 
criticized by the opposition and as such are viewed as avenues for the president to further 
extend his term to eventually make Venezuela adopt the Cuban style of communism.  
The opposition leader and former presidential opponent, Manuel Rosales said that such 
an act by the President is a "constitutional coup"; hence, he campaigned for the rejection 
of the constitutional changes.  
However, there are still a number of scholars arguing that the Bolivarism 
movement of Chávez is something that would promote Free Trade.  President Chávez is 
viewed as a leader who desires in creating its own trading alliances that would present a 
unified front and an alternative force in the world economy.135 Albeit, despite the 
opening of the of the Venezuelan economy to neo-liberal policies, the surge of 
government spending has paved the way for the government to have difficulty in terms of 
managing its foreign currency reserves due to debts payments, social policy programs 
and preservation and development for the oil sector.136    
B. DEFENSE SPENDING 
Venezuela’s defense spending has increased by 62 percent between 2002 and 
2007 shown in figure 1.137 In 2007, military expenditures totaled over 2.0 billion dollars 
(US).138 The 2008 actual expenditures are expected to be even higher due in part to the 
increase in oil prices from 2007 to 2008. Oil prices have quadrupled from 2002 through 
the peak in July 2008.  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
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(SIPRI), 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product was spent on defense. This is among 
the highest levels of defense burden in South America.139 
 
 
Figure 6.   SIPRI Defense Spending Data for Venezuela (2005 US$) and Oil Prices (2007 
US$).140 
 
Figure 5 shows defense spending rising along with the increase in oil prices. In 
2008, its estimated oil will contribute 75 billion dollars to government coffers, up from 
43.5 billion in 2007.141 As long as oil prices remain high, the additional spending on 
defense will have little impact on the overall economy. Venezuela certainly has the funds 
to support increased defense spending; the next question is why? 
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C.  REASONS FOR THE INCREASED VENEZUELAN DEFENSE 
SPENDING? 
The empirical data on defense burden shows an obvious upward trend in defense 
spending. Analysis of defense spending in Venezuela requires the inclusion of the three 
theories provided with the major constitutions changes discussed above. As with Chile 
the first relies on the existence of an arms race in South America and Venezuela’s 
purchases are keeping in step with other military powers in the region such as Chile and 
Brazil. Another theory links the additional spending to the explosive increase in oil prices 
due to the current commodities boom. A third theory points to the need for military 
modernization after years of being denied access to high tech equipment; such 
modernization is said to be necessary for the military to respond to the threats facing the 
country. 
1.  Arms Race 
Venezuela has not been involved in a major war since the War for Independence 
almost two hundred years ago. However, Venezuela has been involved in a number of 
border disputes with Colombia over natural gas and other resources. At times relations 
have been tumultuous.  Most recently, Chávez sent troops to Colombian border after the 
Colombian military crossed into Ecuadorian territory attacking a FARC camp and killing 
several high-level FARC leaders. The Venezuelan president has also criticized the 
Colombian government for its close ties with the United States. Although Venezuelan 
defense spending does not seem to be related to its tenuous relations with Colombia, 
Venezuela does have a right to be concerned. As its closest neighbor, Colombia 
outspends Venezuela 2 to 1 on defense, spending 4 percent of GDP or 5.3 billion dollars 
in 2007.142 Most of Colombia’s defense spending however is directly aimed at curbing 
the drug trade and strengthening internal security rather than external missions or threats. 
Other big spenders in the region include Brazil and Chile. However, the relations 
between many of the countries in the region are peaceful. Chávez only ever claims to be 
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seriously concerned about the United States and that he wants his defense apparatus 
capable of deterring an American attack. Little is said by Chávez or other Venezuelan 
officials that they are worried about the level of arms entering the region. Other factors 
seem to play a larger role in Venezuela’s arms build-up.   
2.  Commodities Boom  
Since 2003, the world price of oil has set all time records and continues to 
maintain high price levels amid strong demand from developing nations such as Chile 
and Venezuela. Oil is Venezuela’s number one export and generated over 75 billion 
dollars in revenues in 2007.143 Oil revenues are by far Venezuela’s most important single 
contributor to the economy. Over thirty-one percent of GDP comes in the form of oil 
revenues.144 Oil prices have increased dramatically between 2003 and the present. Shown 
in Figure 6, oil has nearly quadrupled in price. From below thirty dollars per barrel in 




Figure 7.   Crude Oil Prices.146 
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Like in Chile, state wealth and economic growth positively correlate with 
increased defense burden.147 In other words, the rising tide of oil wealth is floating all 
boats in Venezuela including defense. “With greater resources per capita a state can meet 
the basic social welfare needs of the population and still have a larger proportion of 
income left over for defense.”148 Additionally, with good economic growth, “As was true 
with the effect of wealth, it appears here that states will try to buy more security when 
they can afford it.”149 Not only can Venezuela afford to increase spending on defense, but 
also the military has the support from President Hugo Chávez to continue spending. 
3.  Modernization  
With the extra funds from high priced oil, Venezuelan is taking the opportunity 
revitalize the military. In fact, the Venezuelan military claims the oil funds are necessary 
to replace and modernize old outdated equipment. Venezuela plans call for a force 
structure revitalization program worth more than 30 billion dollars through 2012.150 The 
navy alone is planning to spend about one billion dollars on fleet and equipment 
upgrades. Venezuela’s military modernization program has fallen behind over the past 
thirty years.  
Venezuela’s military operates with old outdated equipment. Without the 
capability and technology to build its own military hardware, Venezuela looks to more 
developed countries for advanced military hardware. However because Venezuela was 
prohibited from purchasing advanced weapons from the United States and many of its 
allies its equipment slowly became obsolete. With the exception of the sale of F-16 
fighter aircraft in the early 1980s by the Reagan administration, it was forced to acquire a 
second hand collection of military hardware since the Carter era Presidential Decision 
Directive 13 that banned sales of U.S. attack jets and other high-tech items to countries 
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with poor human rights records. In 1997, President Clinton repealed the directive but 
Venezuela remains on the state department’s list of countries of concern on terrorism, 
which prohibits major arms sales to the country.151  
The Venezuelan armed forces are making significant progress in its 
modernization goals despite the high tech weapons ban. Each of the armed services have 
either purchased or plan to purchase new fighter jets, tankers, combat helicopters, search 
and rescue planes, early warning systems, war ships both surface and submarines and 
associated weapons systems, maritime helicopters, tanks, multiple rocket systems, 
armored personnel carriers, and a fleet of new trucks including heavy equipment 
transporters.152 Other equipment purchases or upgrades could come as necessary. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The changes that were brought forth by the Chávez government have caused 
various concerns for the international community. The reforms of the Venezuelan 
constitution are highly populist in nature and are seen by many to threaten democracy in 
Venezuela. Combined with the excessive government spending the country is heading 
down a dangerous road. Venezuela’s oil production appears to be not exactly in 
proportionate to the amount social expenses of the government. The government had only 
spent a couple of hundred million dollars on oil research and development in 2006 while 
spending billions on social spending. This spending also threatens the negative effects of 
high inflation rates.  
New economic and social policies could pave the way for a serious decline in the 
oil sector and eventually would cause economic problems throughout the country. 
However, with the increase in oil prices President Chávez has been able to fund all of his 
social programs as well as substantially increase the levels of defense spending.  
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From new tanks to planes, rifles and helicopters the Venezuelan military has 
dramatically increased its defense spending since 2003. The more than doubling of the 
defense budget from 2003 through 2008 Venezuela leads South America in increased 
defense spending and is among the leading defense spenders overall. However, the 
motivation for the increased spending does not appear to be driven by competition among 
countries within the region. The theory that Venezuela is engaged in an arms race is 
proving to be unlikely. Rather the Venezuelan military feels it is in desperate need of new 
and updated military hardware to counter an external threat, the United States. 
The combined need for new equipment and high price of oil appear to be the key 
drivers of Venezuela’s increased defense spending. Venezuela has been subject to a 
United States driven arms embargo since the Carter era. With the exception of its 
dilapidating F-16 fleet purchased in the early 1980s, Venezuela has been unable to 
purchase any new military equipment until only recently. With the rapid rise in crude oil 
prices Venezuela has the funds to look to other world powers for new highly advanced 
military hardware.  
Russia has filled the void, has forged a close relationship with the Chávez 
administration and, as a result, will provide Venezuela with billions of dollars worth of 
new equipment and training. Both countries are working toward combined naval 
exercises in the very near future and plan to continue to build on their relationship. This 
concerns the United States; however, how will the overall effect of the Venezuela’s 
military actions impact countries in South America? 
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IV. AVOIDING REGIONAL CONFLICT 
Since the beginning of the commodities boom, Chile and Venezuela have been on 
the leading edge of increased defense spending and modernization in South America and 
other countries in the region are keeping a close eye on their progress. In general, defense 
spending around the world is on the decline. In South America, however, this is not the 
case. Nearly every country in the region has experienced an increase in defense spending. 
While Chile and Venezuela lead in increased defense spending from 2003 - 2008, the 
other leaders in defense spending are Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. Collectively the 
region spent over thirty billion dollars on defense in 2007.153 The consequences of the 
arms build-up in Chile and Venezuela could be a regional arms race explaining the 
increase in defense spending throughout. Have Chile and Venezuela spurred an arms race 
in the region and are the countries in the region being pressured into keeping pace? 
Countries in the region have reacted to Chile and Venezuela’s increased military might. 
However, the reactions are as varied as the countries themselves.    
Brazil by far spends more absolute dollars on defense than any other country in 
the region but due to its large overall budget its defense spending as a percentage of GDP 
is on par with other countries in the region, making Brazil the most powerful nation in the 
region., Brazil is a large and diverse country with officials on both sides of the arms race 
issue.  Recently, Jose Sarney, a leading Brazilian senator expressed concern over 
Venezuela’s increased defense spending said, “Venezuela is buying arms that are not a 
threat to the United States but which unbalance forces within the continent.”154 On the 
other side of the issue however, Brazil is not new to the defense game and as the clear 
heavy weight in the region has also benefited from high commodity prices and has 
increased its defense spending by 12.2 percent from 2003 – 2006.155 However, the 
Brazilian Defense Minister says flat out that there is not an arms race in South America. 
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“There is no arms race in South America,” he said after meeting with Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez.156 “It is important that countries have weapons. The projection 
of power by South America depends on its dissuasive powers of defense.” 157  
Brazil has proposed a South American Defense Council that would be a response 
to the “need to create a common South American defense and security organ”; in a region 
that lacks an effective cooperation mechanism.158  
Other countries have proposed similar collective defense organizations such as the 
South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) and Organization of Latin American States 
implying willful cooperation between countries and not a competitive arms race. While 
many South American countries are increasing their defense spending, none of the 
increases seems to be directly related to Chile or Venezuela’s expenditures. On the 
contrary, all of Chile and Venezuela’s historical enemies have or are in the beginnings of 
peaceful cooperation and relations. Many of the countries in South America including 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and others are attempting to build 
collective defense organizations that would require some level of integration of armed 
forces across the continent.  
A.  PREDICTIONS FROM GAME THEORY LITERATURE FOR 
REGIONAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AMERICA 
In the region, both Chile and Venezuela have both emerged as key players in the 
region. They have both expanded their economic international roles. Chile and Venezuela 
have experienced high rates of economic growth, which has had a significant impact 
upon their influence in the region. The other countries in the region cannot dismiss these 
rising stars and therefore must develop international policies and practices designed to 
foster cooperation and enable an international relationship that will be mutually 
beneficial. Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation serves to provide 
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characteristics of the types of potential policy strategies using Cooperation Theory and 
the prisoner’s dilemma in which the countries in South America can develop policy 
decisions that will achieve cooperation with these two countries.159 The focus of this 
analysis will be on Chilean and Venezuelan international policies in particular their 
defense spending policies. 
Axelrod’s findings have been the basis of a wide range of work in behavioral 
research and game theory. “Much of current behavioral research stems from Robert 
Axelrod’s computer simulations of behavioral strategies in prisoner’s dilemma 
games.”160 His theories have been tested by a number of experts and applied to various 
topics including international negotiation and arms control. The results of Axelrod’s work 
showed that one strategy was consistently successful over other strategies. TIT for TAT 
the dominate strategy, promotes cooperation between players or countries. The basis for 
the strategy is to cooperate at first and then to reciprocate your opponents’ behavior from 
the previous interaction.  “Reciprocity research since Axelrod’s simulations has been 
much more narrow, concentrating on tests of Axelrod’s explanations for why tit-for-tat is 
such an effective strategy.”161 TIT for TAT has been found to so effective as to be the 
basis for international negotiations. Parks and Komorita suggest using TIT for TAT 
qualities when negotiating, “Negotiators should immediately reciprocate cooperative 
actions; be very careful to clearly convey all information; and carefully evaluate the 
opponent’s actions.”162  The wealth of literature shows TIT for TAT to be a robust 
strategy; however, it is not perfect all situations.  Daniel Druckman’s work, The Social 
Psychology of Arms Control and Reciprocation found that among adversaries TIT for 
TAT may not be the best strategy.163 TIT for TAT’s strict rules do not account for 
situations such as mistrust between players. Druckman states, “In a climate of mistrust 
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recipication is likely to be misinterpreted.”164 Therefore TIT for TAT may not always be 
the best strategy especially when dealing with long time foes. Even in Axelrod’s work 
TIT for TAT did not win in every situation. However despite some short comings, TIT 
for TAT can be highly useful in promoting cooperation. Therefore this paper will focus 
on Axelrod’s findings and will apply TIT for TAT to make defense policy 
recommendations for Chile and Venezuela. 
1.  Theory Overview 
Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation asks the question, “Under what 
conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?”165 
The answer to this question has an important impact on policymaking decisions. 
Assuming that Chile and Venezuela are egoists operating without a central authority, 
Axelrod’s findings are useful in determining policy in regards to both Chile and 
Venezuela that will lead to mutual cooperation and in turn mutual benefit.  
In order to determine under what conditions cooperation will emerge Axelrod 
develops his Cooperation Theory by using the prisoner’s dilemma. In the case of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, there are two players and each must make a choice that affects the 
other without the other knowing which choice the other will make. Each player can 
choose one of only two options; they can either cooperate or defect. Both players have 
more to gain if they both cooperate than if they both defect. However if one cooperates 
and the other defects it is a zero sum result (the game overall is a non-zero sum game) 
and the defector benefits by receiving all of the gain and the cooperator gets nothing. By 
assigning points to each potential outcome, the payoffs of the game are much easier to 
understand. If both players cooperate, they each earn three points. If both defect, they 
each earn one point. If one player defects the other cooperates then they get five points 
and zero points respectively. The four potential outcomes are 5, 3, 1 and 0 points.  
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2.  Rules of the Game 
Axelrod’s theory is based on several rounds of an iterated computer based 
competition using a wide range of strategies submitted from players of various 
backgrounds from all over the world. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma began with sixteen 
original players in the first round and grew to over 60 players in the second round. Each 
competed against the other in a round robin tournament where each player was paired 
with each other player and the goal of the game was to accumulate as many points as 
possible. In other words, you only need more points than the other strategies at the end of 
the tournament. This is not a zero sum game with a clear winner and loser but a method 
in which to determine which strategy was most the successful. Axelrod defines success in 
a number of ways, which will be discussed later.  
The players of the game each had the same set of rules. They could develop a 
strategy as simple or as complex as they felt necessary. There was not a limit on the 
number of identical strategies and each strategy would be paired with its own twin and a 
random strategy that randomly cooperated and defected with equal probability.166 The 
payoff matrix was as described above where the point’s outcomes could be 5, 3, 1, or 0 
depending upon the combination of choices and in the first round of the tournament each 
game consisted of only 200 moves. Each player was also provided the results of 
preliminary tournaments including the winning and losing strategies. At the end of the 
first round there seemed to be a dominate strategy. In addition to performing well and 
winning the first round, the strategy of TIT FOR TAT also performed well in the two 
preliminary tournaments with a win and a second place. TIT FOR TAT had accumulated 
the most points in two of the three games. TIT FOR TAT is a strategy that is considered a 
nice strategy. It will never be the first to defect. It simply will cooperate and then follow 
its opponents last move. For example TIT FOR TAT will always cooperate as long as its 
opponent continues to cooperate and will always defect when the opponent defects. If the  
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opponent switches from cooperation to defection and then back again, TIT FOR TAT 
will simply follow the last move of its opponent. This strategy proved successful in the 
second round as well.167 
The second round the tournament included four times as many players. In 
addition to more players and strategies, the second round of the tournament implemented 
a simple but significant change to the rules of the game. The number of rounds was not 
fixed and would end after a random number of moves. In the first round, it was 
discovered that it did not pay to cooperate in the final move. Knowing that the individual 
match was going to end after the 200th move and without the benefit of future cooperation 
there was no incentive to cooperate and players would defect in the later moves (198,199, 
200, etc). By removing the fixed amount of moves and randomizing them, the end game 
effects discovered in the first round were removed. This proved to be significant when 
players felt they had a significant chance of continuing their interaction with the other 
player. TIT FOR TAT won this round and subsequent variants of the game.168 
3.  Defining Success 
Success presented itself in a variety ways in the tournament and the outcomes will 
be used when recommending specific policy decisions in regards to Chile and Venezuela. 
Accumulating the most points against an individual opponent for each interaction turned 
out not to be necessary to win the tournament. For example, TIT FOR TAT did not win a 
single individual game. By the nature of the TIT FOR TAT strategy, it can at best tie an 
individual strategy. However, in the long run, with many different opponents, TIT FOR 
TAT proved to accumulate the most points with the highest average amount of points per 
game. The TIT FOR TAT strategy was successful in several more ways that are 
important. 
TIT FOR TAT success can also be measured in terms of being robust, stable and 
initially viable. By changing the distribution and the types of strategies in the game, 
Axelrod tested the robustness of TIT FOR TAT. As s result, TIT FOR TAT accumulated 
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the most points in five of six different variants of the game, proving that TIT FOR TAT is 
robust. This is of particular importance to know that the strategy is viable under a wide 
range of players and circumstances such as in the international system.  TIT FOR TAT 
was also stable when the shadow of the future looms larger than the benefits of the short 
term, meaning that once it is fully established it is resistant to invasion by other 
strategies.169 In other words, in the international system if all of the players are where 
using the TIT FOR TAT strategy and cooperating it would not pay to defect and thus 
everyone would maintain the TIT FOR TAT strategy. Even in a situation where most of 
the players are using the ALL D (always defect. Another stable strategy) strategy a small 
cluster of TIT FOR TAT players can invade and overcome the ALL D players, which is 
an example of initially viability. Initial viability is the ability to get a foothold in an 
environment that is initially non-cooperative.170 As long as there are enough interactions 
with one another then TIT FOR TAT can flourish and take a foothold and eventually 
driving ALL D to extinction. The reason is because the other players will all eventually 
switch to this strategy because they will see that it is accumulating more points and 
realize that TIT FOR TAT is a superior strategy.  
a.  TIT FOR TAT’s Qualities 
It is difficult to argue TIT FOR TAT’s overwhelming success. The reasons 
why TIT FOR TAT is successful and the redeeming characteristics of the strategy can be 
carried over into the international system. TIT FOR TAT can be best described as being 
nice, provocable, forgiving and clear.171 TIT FOR TAT’s combination of being nice, 
provocable, forgiving and clear is the basis for its success. By being nice, TIT FOR TAT 
keeps itself from getting into unnecessary trouble when the opponent is also nice. By 
being provocable and retaliating when the opponent defects, TIT FOR TAT discourages 
further defection. When the opponent tries to make amends by cooperating again, TIT  
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FOR TAT is quick to forgive and begin cooperating. This strategy is simple and the 
opponent is quick to learn and can see what is coming making the strategy clear to the 
other players. 
TIT FOR TAT has the basic qualities that can be further developed into 
suggestions for how a country can do well when dealing with another country in a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation. To begin, a country must be able to effectively choose the 
right strategy. Axelrod has four suggestions: “Don’t be envious; don’t be the first to 
defect; reciprocate both cooperation and defection; don’t be too clever.”172 Do not be 
envious. Remember that in the end, you want to accumulate the most points, or in the 
case of the international system, a country wants an agreement that will support its policy 
goals. This means that each country can mutually benefit and that other country can 
actually benefit more through dual cooperation on a single move. To be envious and try 
to rectify the imbalance, the only choice is to defect, which can spiral out of control with 
multiple defecting moves or conflict, and each country ends up worse off than before. In 
this way, it does not pay to be concerned with the short run.  
Be nice and do not be the first to defect. A common factor of all the 
strategies that performed well in the tournament was the fact that they were not the first 
to defect; they were nice strategies. This is particularly important when there is a high 
likelihood that each country will have future interactions. In today’s globally connected 
world the Chile cannot avoid interactions with Venezuela. By being nice, a country can 
avoid unnecessary conflict. In addition, nice strategies can to invade and it only takes a 
small number of nice strategies to eventually dominate. In the end the mean, defecting 
strategies are ecologically weeded out. Of course, it does not pay to be overly nice.  
Reciprocate both cooperation and defection. We have seen the benefits of 
cooperation however there is also a meaningful benefit in defecting in response to your 
opponent’s defection. Being provocable, as mentioned earlier, discourages defection. 
However, it is also the characteristic that makes TIT FOR TAT resistant to invasion by 
mean strategies and is ideal in a wide number of situations. By practicing reciprocity, TIT 
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FOR TAT was able to find the right level of forgiveness in providing a one for one 
response that worked in a wide range of settings.173  
Do not be too clever. TIT FOR TAT was one of the simplest strategies 
submitted in both rounds of the tournament. Several of the strategies submitted were very 
complicated and difficult to understand. Some were so complicated it was difficult 
distinguishing them from the RANDOM strategy. Unlike in football, where one team is 
out to defeat the other team with secret plays that the other team cannot predict, in a non-
zero sum game it pays to have clarity. When the other player can predict your next move 
and believes that there is a good chance of future cooperation they are more likely to 
cooperate. When they are unsure of their opponent’s strategy, they have no incentive to 
cooperate and the best option is to defect.174  
4.  Impact of Chile and Venezuela’s Expanded Roles in the Region 
Both countries are major players in South America and have increasingly 
expanded roles internationally. The two countries South America world largest increase 
in defense spending, both have more than doubled defense spending since 2003. Their 
economies continue to grow and as a result have increased their regional influence. Both 
countries have seen tremendous economic growth over the past several years. In 2007, 
Chile experienced a 5.1 percent real growth rate and Venezuela experienced an 8.4 
percent real growth rate.175  
Chile and Venezuela are two very different countries but both have a significant 
impact to the region. As both economies have grown, their militaries have benefited from 
increased funds resulting in massive amounts of new equipment purchases. Chile alone 
spent nearly 4.8 billion dollars on its military in 2007 behind only Colombia and Brazil. 
While Venezuela’s defense budget does not match those of Chile, they are significant to 
the Chile and the region. In addition both countries’ have a tremendous wealth of natural 
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resources  and their recent rise of the world’s commodities prices over the past decade, 
having a direct impact on defense spending policies.   
5.  Policy Strategy 
The arms build-up in these two countries has not gone unnoticed by others in the 
region. Two separate examples are among the most polarized relationships in the region: 
the relationship between Chile and Peru and the relationship between Venezuela and 
Colombia.  
In Chile and Peru, the relations between both countries have been tenuous ever 
since the War of the Pacific when Chile annexed a large portion of Peruvian land and 
shut off access to the sea to Bolivia. Although Chile’s national budget is twice the size of 
Peru’s, Chile spends nearly four times as much as Peru on defense. Similarly, Colombia 
outspends Venezuela two to one on defense and Colombia’s close relationship with the 
United States further exacerbates the sometime tenuous relations. This analysis focus on 
potential policy applications on the part of each of the countries that will support 
increased cooperation that then can be extrapolated throughout the region.  
Each of countries has the ability to build up their militaries as well as strategically 
move their forces around within their borders.  This means that they can build up forces 
along the border between the two countries similar to the situation between North and 
South Korea. Assuming that cooperation and mutual benefit would result in no build up 
of forces this sets up a typical prisoner’s dilemma. Taken individually and factoring out 
organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations 
(UN) Chile and Peru, and Colombia and Venezuela are in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
Assuming that their relations will continue indefinitely into the future the door is open for 
a TIT FOR TAT style defense policy to flourish. Each country can either cooperate or 
defect. By cooperating, they will not add additional military manpower and equipment to 
the border. When additional forces are added it is a defection. 
Chile and Venezuela should use the TIT FOR TAT policy for its interactions with 
Peru and Colombia respectively. Here is where Axelrod’s suggestions can be applied to 
Chilean defense policies with Peru and Venezuelan defense policies with Colombia. 
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Chilean and Venezuelan policy makers should not be envious of Peru and Colombia 
militarily. Both countries are currently benefiting from peaceful relations. The goal for 
the Chile and Venezuela must be to mutually benefit from peaceful relations. An example 
would be if politicians were concerned about (envious) of the location of forces within 
Peru or Colombia they may react to that situation by defecting and adding their forces 
near the border. Peru and Colombia could then respond with a defection and the situation 
could spiral out of control resulting in a worse off situation. Chile and Venezuela should 
also not be the first to defect. Although they may be under pressure from their 
constituents and residents in the border area to defect they must make every attempt to be 
nice in terms of not defecting and pushing for additional forces knowing that future peace 
is in the balance it will pay off to be nice and cooperate. However as it was stated earlier 
it is important to not be overly nice. Policy makers should reciprocate both cooperation 
and defection. If, for example, Peru defects and increases its troops along the border then 
policy makers in Chile should quickly respond with a defection perhaps sending 
additional forces but less than the amount sent by Peru to try and limit the chances of 
Peru responding with another defection and cooperating on the next move. Chile’s 
defection should be slightly less negative than Peru’s original defection  — as if to say 
that Chile is willing to be nice and will cooperate, but will not be a pushover. The same 
would also apply to Venezuela and Colombia  
TIT FOR TAT is also a simple and predictable strategy. Peru and Colombia will 
easily be able to determine future Chilean and Venezuelan border defense strategies. 
Politicians should not try to be too clever. A complex strategy is not clear and will not 
send the message that Chile and Venezuela are willing to cooperate. When Peru and 
Colombia are unsure if Chile and Venezuela will cooperate, their best alternative will be 
to defect risking the echoing defect effect where each country continues to defect. TIT 
FOR TAT is an easy strategy that makes it clear to everyone that the Chile is willing to 
cooperate. 
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6.  Ideal, Yet Not Perfect 
TIT FOR TAT is an ideal strategy for Chilean and Venezuelan policy makers 
when developing defense policy with Peru and Colombia respectively. However, it is not 
a perfect policy and has a possible weakness in the international system. In the real 
world, time is an important factor. Time was eliminated as a factor in Axelrod’s computer 
tournament. However, in the international system, results and rewards for cooperating or 
defecting often come slow and are not always readily visible. Politicians often want or 
feel they need immediate results to take back to their constituents. The benefits of 
cooperating sometimes take years to present themselves. Likewise, the negative effects of 
defecting can and often take an equally long time to filter their way through the system. 
As a result, politicians may not follow the TIT FOR TAT strategy. In the end, this 
strategy has been proven robust, stable and initially viable.  
B.  CONCLUSION 
Overall South America is a peaceful region and is arguably one of the most 
peaceful regions in the world in terms conventional inter-state warfare. The level of peace 
in the region could be because of TIT for TAT like policies. The latest example is when 
Colombian forces crossed the border into Ecuador and attacked and killed a high-level 
FARC leader as well as a number of lower level FARC members. Many leaders in the 
region felt that Colombia violated Ecuador’s sovereignty including Venezuela 
Colombia’s neighbor. Both countries denounced the Colombian actions or defection and 
then sent forces to the border. Colombia’s defection was met with another defection but 
not one that would promote another defection on the part of Colombia. Ecuadorian and 
Venezuelan forces went to their respective borders with Colombia; however, they never 
crossed into Colombia or attacked any Colombian troops. The defection was enough to 
let Colombia that a defection will not be tolerated and that each country would rather 
cooperate and have a peaceful relationship. Several weeks after the defections, officials 
from all three countries met to discuss the issue and forces were then pulled back from 
the borders. The TIT for TAT response was a viable strategy in this case. Perhaps more  
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politicians and policy makers should read The Evolution of Cooperation. In the end, “if 
we understand the process better, we can use our foresight to speed up the evolution of 
cooperation.”176 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Chile and Venezuela have clearly increased their defense burden over the past 
five years. Three possible theories were put forth to explain the reason behind the 
increased expenditures: existing arms race, explosive increase in oil prices and the need 
for military modernization. Chile and Venezuela clearly fall into the later two categories. 
The commodities boom and need for equipment can explain their defense spending 
growth.  
The Chilean military is structured to receive the benefit high commodity prices 
directly. As mentioned previously, Chile’s copper law provides for a direct correlation 
between increased copper prices and increased defense spending. Additionally, Chile 
displayed a need for new and updated equipment. Going years without the ability to 
adequately modernize its equipment, Chile has had a pent up demand for military 
equipment required to fulfill its national security strategy. The benefit of high copper 
prices, relaxed U.S. policies and the need for equipment were the right mix of ingredients 
to spark off a massive military modernization effort and increased defense spending. 
The Venezuelan military benefits from high commodity prices as well as from the 
belief in the threat of a U.S. invasion. As discussed, Venezuela’s president continues to 
make the argument that the United States is a threat and the Venezuelan military needs to 
modernize to defend against that threat. Additionally, the Venezuelan military suffers 
from old equipment and is in need for new and updated hardware. As with Chile, 
Venezuela spent decades in the dark, unable to adequately modernize its equipment. The 
benefit of high oil prices, and the willingness of countries like Russia to provide the high-
tech weapons, provided the right combination of factors that led to a nearly 50 percent 
increase in defense spending.  
The chance that Chile and Venezuela has promoted an arms race in South 
America in unlikely. Based on the evidence put forth above, most South American 
countries are attempting to work closer and improve relations. Almost the entire 
continent has increased defense spending in South America, including Argentina, Brazil, 
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Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay Peru, and all have the need for modernization and 
the ability to pay for it with high priced commodity revenues. From precious and 
industrial metals to agricultural products and oil and gas, each of the countries with 
increased defense spending has benefited from high commodity prices. The commodity 
boom is the fuel behind the increased defense spending within the region.  
The region has a bright future ahead. By cooperating and working together the 
peaceful region with its wealth natural resources is sure to be a major player in the 
international scene. Policy recommendations include using the TIT for TAT strategy 
from Axelrod to promote the cooperation needed to catapult the region into the world’s 
spotlight. Each of the countries in the region should use a TAT for TAT style strategy in 
their regional relations. The strategy is simple, easy to predict, allows for an avenue for 
all countries to cooperate even after a defection. The countries in the region already 
appear to be using TIT for TAT style strategies in the region. As explained in chapter 
four, recent military actions between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela have proved that 
TIT for TAT is a viable strategy. In the end, South American countries are cooperating 
despite increasing levels of defense spending by Chile and Venezuela. With these sound 
regional policies, South America is sure to maintain its low levels of interstate war, 
peaceful relations and place itself as a important player in the international arena.   
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